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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

his news conference not long ago, I shuddered when I heard him-perhaps not calculatingly-refer to us as the peacekeeper in Southeast Asia.

It seemed to me that the logical, first step to have been taken by the Senate and by the House of Representatives when this problem was highlighted and brought to the attention of Congress and the people in such a sharp way by the action in Cambodia, was to repeal the Tonkin resolution which has remained for 6 years as a formal expression of approval by Congress for almost any kind of action in Southeast Asia. That should have been the first step before we proceeded to the consideration of the more drastic step or expedient of exercising our power of the purse and attempting to shut off, under a given set of circumstances, the pay, the support, the arming, and the protection of American troops serving in Southeast Asia.

Therefore, I am glad that the able Senator from Kansas has offered this proposal as an independent amendment to the Military Sales Act, not attached, as I understand it, in any way to the so-called Cooper-Church amendment.

I hope we will be given an opportunity to vote on this measure. I shall most certainly vote to repeal the Gulf of Tonkin resolution and thereby seek to rectify the error that I consider I made and have bitterly regretted since that resolution was originally adopted.

I do not mean to claim that such action represents the whole solution for the problem now before us, or necessarily that it discharges the full duty of Congress or the Senate to deal with that situation. But I am saying it is the logical first step and I would like to see it taken. I think it is both logical and reasonable that we take that step before we go on to the consideration of the Cooper-Church amendment or any other amendment that has to do with control of the situation in Southeast Asia by the control of the purse strings.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DOLE. I have the floor, I yield to the distinguished majority leader.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I am in accord with what the distinguished Senator from New Hampshire has said. I would point out we have had a measure reported unanimously by the Committee on Foreign Relations seeking in a concurrent resolution to bring about rescinding of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. There is some feeling that the concurrent resolution should be given consideration because it had been considered in committee and it has been onthe calendar for some weeks.

As far as I am concerned I intend to vote for the Dole amendment and I intend at some time to call up the concurrent resolution so that we will have two shots at it to make absolutely sure the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, which I think was carried to an extreme under a previous administration, is liquidated once and for all.

Mr. COTTON. I thank the distinguished majority leader.

Mr. President, I shall be only a moment.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, who has the floor?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bellmon). The Senator from Kansas has the floor.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Is he yielding for a question?

Mr. DOLE. Yes; I am waiting for it. Mr. COTTON. I shall ask the question in just a moment.

Mr. President, I am thoroughly in accord with what the distinguished majority leader has said. I have only one reservation, and I would ask the majority leader if this is not a reasonable reservation so that I will not be violating the rules of the Senate. If we could dispose of this matter now by adopting the Dole amendment, then we do not run the risk, when we have finally voted on the Cooper-Church amendment, of having to start all over again to deal with the Gulf of Tonkin resolution

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I share the views of the Senator from New Hamphire.

Since there has been some reference to the committee report, I wish to read from the committee report:

The Committee on Foreign Relations, to which was referred the concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 64) to terminate certain joint resolutions authorizing the use of the Armed Forces of the United States in certain areas outside the United States, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an amendment and recommends that the concurrent resolution, as amended, do pass.

That is the extent of the committee statement in the report. That language is followed by a recitation of the committee amendment and the recitation of other amendments offered by a number of other Senators, and this is followed by comments from the Department of State with respect to the various resolutions.

I would say to those who indicate that perhaps we should set this aside and discuss what might be in the committee report, the statement which has just been referred to by the junior Senator from Kansas is the total statement of the committee.

But I share the views expressed by the distinguished majority leader and so expressed myself before.

Mr. President, because of the importance of the debate on the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in its entirety in the RECORD.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, is the Senator referring to the report?

Mr. DOLE. I refer to the Senate debate on the Gulf of Tonkin resolution on August 6 and 7, 1964.

Mr. FULBRIGHT, I shall not object. I wish to inquire of the Senator if he is planning to hold the floor all afternoon.

Mr. DOLE. No. I am ready to yield the floor in about 1 minute.

Mr. FULBRIGHT, I do not object.

There being no objection, the excerpts were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

(From the Congressional Record, Aug. 1964]

MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY IN SOUTHEAST ANIA

Mr. Mansfield, Mr. President, I ask that the Vietnam resolution be laid before the Benate. It has been cleared with the chairmen of the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services, with the ranking members of those committees, with the distinguished minority leader [Mr. DIRESEN], and with the distinguished senior Senator from Oregon [Mr. Mosse], who is interested in the subject.

The Presiding Officer. Is there objection? There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the joint resolution (S.J. Res. 189) to promote the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast

Mτ MANSFIELD. Mr. President, a parlia-

mentary inquiry.
The Passiding Officer. The Senator will state it.

Mr. Mansfield. Mr. President, is it agreed that a vote on the treaty with Belgium will be had at 2 o'clock?

The Presiding Officer. The Senator is cor-

Mr. Mansfield. Mr. President, a further

parliamentary inquiry.

The Presiding Officer. The Senator will state it.

Mr. Mansfield. Mr. President, is it further understood that it is the intention to call up the so-called Vietnam resolution following the vote on the treaty?

Mr. Mansfield. Mr. President, I wish to

make a few remarks on the Vietnam resolution.

The President has acted against repeated Communist provocations in the Tonkin Guif. He has acted in the hope of preventing an expansion of the conflict in Asia, in the hope of minimizing the American involvement on that continent.

He has weighed the degree of military response to the degree of military provocation. He has taken military steps for legitimate defense and, at the same time, he has brought the matter to the conference tables of the United Nations, as a matter of urgency in connection with the maintenance of world peace.

He has counseled with the congressional leadership, the relevant committee chairmen and ranking minority members and the Republican candidate for President. Two nights ago he informed the entire Nation of his action.

The President, in short, has acted with a cool head and a steady hand in a most critical situation. He has acted as the leader of a great free nation, fully aware of a great nation's responsibilities to itself, to freedom, and to the peace of the world.

Let no man make light of what has been done in the past 72 hours. What has been is no automatic or certain solution to the difficulties. A reasoned approach to this situation on our part is no assurance that others will have the same capacity. Our own restraint is no guarantee of the restraint of others. Our wish for peace is not necessarily the wish of others.

But the President has acted in the hope of restraining the dogs of war. It remains to be seen, now, whether others will act in the same fashion. Escalators go up as well as down and, in this instance, our hand is not the only hand on the control. We hope for the best. But let us also be prepared for the worst. The situation may well become more critical—far more critical—before its resolu-tion becomes visible.

One would hope that those who have acted with provocation will now cease so to act. One would hope that the United Nations will be helpful. One would hope that those na-

A Spy's Story

OPERATION OVERFLIGHT

Francis Gary Powers with Curt Gentry
(Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 375 pp., \$6,95)

Reviewed by David Wise

The reviewer is co-author with Thomas B. Ross of The U-2 Affair, The Invisible Government and The Espionage Establishment,

Sitting there in his Soviet prison cell, weaving rugs, making envelopes, reading Pushkin, dreaming of banana splits, coconut-cream pie and hamburgers, U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers became reasonably philosophical about his predicament: "Oh, well," he concluded, "they didn't invite me to come..."

The most famous spy of the Cold War waited almost 10 years to tell his story because, he says, John A. McCone, who was director of the Central Intelligence Agency, wouldn't let him write it when he wanted to, following his exchange for Soviet master spy Rudolph Abel in 1962.

A decade after the flight, it is difficult to recapture the full extent of the incredible bungling that took place in Washington when the CIA's high-altitude spy plane was downed 1,200 miles inside the Soviet Union. First, the Eisenhower administration dusted off an inept CIA cover story and announced that the U-2 was a "weather research" plane that had strayed off course. Soviet Premier Khrushchev savored that for two days, then disclosed that he had both the plane and its live pilot. Whereupon the State Department admitted the flight-but said it was unauthorized. Two days after that. President Eisenhower reversed field, took personal responsibility and indicated, through his Secretary of State that the CIA overflights would continue because the Russians didn't have an open society.

Khrushchev stormed and broke up the summit meeting in Paris. Ike finally announced he had called off the U-2 flights, but it was a bit late. And Francis Gary Powers was in jall.

In 10 years, Francis Gary Powers has had a good deal of time to think. He has matured, divorced, remarried, moved to California (to test U-2s for Lockheed at Burbank), fathered a son, Francis Gary Powers II, and built a new life. He has grown. It comes through; and that, more than anything else, is what makes his book interesting.

Operation Overflight solves no ultimate mysteries -we learn little that is clear about the workings of the destructor unit, which Powers did not use to destroy his plane; or about why the CIA timed a flight over Russia so close to a summit meeting on which the world had pinned its fragile hopes for peace. The destructor unit was a device designed, in the event of trouble aloft to allow what Powers describes as "a small but supposedly sufficent margin of time to bail out before the explosion occurred." He denies that the U-2 pilots worried that the CIA had rigged the timer to destroy both plane and pilot. Powers (and CIA) maintain that the unit would not have. destroyed the plane, only the cameras and certain equipment. Yet he says ground crews tested the timer before each flight because "a few seconds could mean life or death."

So the matter remains



Associated Press

Pilot Francis Gary Powers holds a model of the U-2 plane in an appearance before the Senate Armed Forces Committee in 1962.

fuzzy. But we do learn a good deal about Francis Gary Powers, and how his view of life, CIA, and the game wof intenations changed. Powers was raised in the grinding poverty of a remote Virginia valley in Appalachia. Understandably, 🗟 he fled. To the Air Force. When mysterious men playing Keystone Cop games in motel rooms offered him a job at \$30,000 a year ("it was nearly as much as the captain of a commercial airliner received!"), he signed

Shot down near Sverdlovsk, grilled by the KGB, Powers builds a rather persuasive case that he told the Russians as little as possible. After his return, the CIA put Powers through a second grilling. He was rehabilitated by the agency and hailed as a hero-because, CIA, by so doing, could also rehabilitate itself. And Powers knows it. Tho primary concern of his superiors in Langley, Powers writes, "was to get CIA off the hook."

Shunted off to California, kopt under wraps at Lockheed, awarded a secret medal by CIA in 1965 to help keep him happy, Powers had more time to reflect. Despite everything, he has not become bitter. But no man, he writes, "likes to admit he has been used."

Perhaps that is what espionage and Cold War is all about. Governments using playing games, people. pursuing means that gradually become ends. What was more important to the intelligence operators—a summit meeting, or one more U-2 Soviet flight over the Union?

The U-2 episode made Americans aware for the first time that their government spied, and sometimes lied. It focused major attention on CIA, and on the continuing question of how intelligence operations can be made compatible with democratic government. As Francis Gary Powers has observed, "Never again would we be quite so innocent."

Ahead of the jumbo

The State Department is trying to keep ahead of the jumbo age. And it's no simple task.

Last month Secretary of State William P. Rogers met with a distinguished group of private citizens he appointed to study the problems of foreign travel by American citizens. He asked them to come up with suggestions on how the department can better provide services to them abroad.

Former Sen. Leverett Saltonstall is committee chairman. Among other members are former Supreme Court Justice Tom C. Clark and former CIA Director John A. Mc-Cone.

They are being asked to imagine what it will be like a few years hence, when enormous jetliners deposit Americans overseas at ever-increasing rates and in enormous concentrations.

They are going to try to simplify the passport process, help hordes of United States businessmen overseas with investment problems, and generally provide aid and comfort to needy tourists.

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